On Monday, May 12th, there was a magnitude 8.0 earthquake in the Sichuan province that left more than 88,000 people dead or missing. Foreign aid in the form of supplies began to arrive the night of May 15, but foreign rescue teams were not allowed into Sichuan until May 16, well past the critical post-72 hours in which it is most possible to still find people alive. The Chinese only chose to let in teams were from Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Russia. In the Chinese media, Chinese rescue teams were described as efficient and effective and the government was portrayed as openly welcoming international aid. In the foreign media, the coverage was not as plainly positive, describing Chinese rescue teams as unequipped and unprepared and the Chinese attitude towards foreign aid as selective and political. Still, the Chinese response to the earthquake did show increased openness and transparency, thus opening the door for future cooperation in international relief efforts.
2008/08/19 06:53 PM Issue No.133

Diplomatic Truce for China and Taiwan?

The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) have different opinions on the cross-Strait truce in the diplomatic front. In August 2000, then-president Chen Shui-bian, said diplomacy was a necessary activity, hence not only would there not be a diplomatic truce, but Taiwan would try harder to form diplomatic ties. For the KMT, Taiwan is not able to compete with China in terms of political clout or economic assistance in winning new diplomatic recognition, so it is a must for Taiwan and China to agree on freezing the number of diplomatic allies that each side has.

Ma Ying-jeou, then Chairman of the KMT, proposed the idea of cross-Strait reconciliation and diplomatic truce in 2006. In his presidential inaugural address, he urged Beijing and Taipei to “pursue reconciliation and truce in both cross-strait and international arenas.” However, Ma’s definition of a “diplomatic truce” — its content, scope, and implementation— all await clarification.
2008/07/31 05:47 PM Issue No.132

The US-Taiwan Arms Sale Freeze: Foresight or Failure?

During the first several months of the Ma Ying-jeou administration in Taipei, the United States, in a departure from its oft-stated goal of opposing unilateral moves across the Strait, has itself unilaterally changed the calculations of policymakers in both Beijing and Taipei by announcing an unofficial freeze in its arms sales to Taiwan, which currently includes a US$11 billion proposal for a series of defensive arms, as well as the delivery of several dozen F-16 aircraft to Taiwan as part of an additional US$5 billion sale. This analysis will evaluate how domestic politics, US-Taiwan relations, and US-PRC relations all played a factor in the arms sale freeze, and furthermore demonstrate how the US shift ultimately benefits Beijing while harming the state of US-Taiwan relations.

First, the arms sale freeze can be seen as a refusal by President George W. Bush’s unwillingness to interfere in the Taiwan Strait during the last few months of his administration. As a lame-duck president, Bush’s actions cannot realistically bring about peace in the Taiwan Strait before the end of his term; however, he does recognize that appeasing China during this time would contribute towards his ultimate legacy, while handing the volatile political negotiations to his successor. Despite calls from various sources, including the Obama and McCain campaigns as well as several other senators, to undo this unofficial freeze, it seems as if there is a possibility, albeit a slight one, of the freeze lasting until 2009, when the new president is inaugurated. Randall Schriver, a key advisor to President McCain, noted that the US had an obligation to supply arms to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act, and that a new administration would come under significant pressure to honor this law. However, despite the political nature of the situation, it is also clear that the longer the arms freeze remains in place, the more likely it will become ingrained into a new “status quo” and that the more difficult it will be to restart the sales without having to concede yet another strategic interest to China.
2008/07/31 05:25 PM Issue No.131

The Security Challenges to the Beijing Olympic: How Real?

As the Beijing Olympic, scheduled to be started on 8 August 2008, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been working even harder in preparation on almost all sectors and aspects of the Games. They have been working at a faster pace and with a greater focus on security concern as well. In view of the statements and efforts that the CCP leadership has devoted to the Games in the past year or two, it seems beyond doubt that, in order to demonstrate to the world that China is a responsible, capable and stable country, Beijing will take no chances to ensure the success and the security of such a major event. Therefore, apart from sport-related preparations, Beijing, supported by a massive mobilization of both huge manpower and sophisticated equipment, is also focusing on a rather comprehensive enhancement of security measures for the Games.
2008/07/24 10:00 AM Issue No.130

The New Matrix of Taiwan’s Foreign Policy

People across the world tuned in on May 20 to hear Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou deliver his inaugural speech, and not just the portion of the electorate that voted for him in the March presidential election. Everyone with a stake in the stability of the Straits got a piece of the pie—and the United States and China walked away with the biggest pieces. In his speech, Ma offered Chinese President Hu Jintao a grand bargain for the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to co-manage cross-Strait relations between the two parties on both sides of the Strait, in a speech full of giving that only stopped short of letting China eat the cake too—Ma unilaterally offered to set aside the issue of Taiwan ‘s sovereignty, proclaiming that “sovereignty” will be a non-issue in cross-Strait relations under his administration and “what matters is … core values and way of life.” What Ma meant by core values could perhaps be interpreted as “Taiwan consciousness” and the way of life meaning Taiwan’s de facto independence, and if this were true, it may seem like a win-win-win-win situation. Beijing, at least while Ma is in office, does not have to worry about the island moving closer to de jure independence and Hu can avoid having his legacy be branded as the “one who lost Taiwan,” Washington gets to take a breather, the Taiwanese economy will likely get a needed jolt, and the international community (namely the EU) can deal with both sides of the Strait without stepping into the line of fire, and a cursory look at the odds of this scenario seems like a sure bet for all sides. Yet there may be more challenges in store for the future of Taiwan's foreign policy and particularly Sino-U.S. relations.
2008/06/04 10:01 AM Issue No. 129

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